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Among the more enduring results in game theory and economics are those
which draw upon the close relationship between Walrasian equilibria and
core-like cooperative concepts in large economies. This connection dates back
to Edgeworth’s (1881) conjecture on the convergence of the core to the set
of Walrasian allocations, which was established by Debreu and Scarf (1963)
in the context of replica economies. Modeling the economy as an atomless
measure space of consumers, Aumann (1964) established an equivalence be-
tween core and competitive allocations.1 While there do exist exceptions to
the convergence or equivalence principle2 the broad scope of the convergence
result is indeed remarkable.
The aim of the present paper is to study core convergence in economies
with asymmetric information. However, as there are various natural core con-
cepts as well as price equilibrium concepts in the general context of asymmet-
ric information, one needs to be somewhat more precise about the solution
concepts under consideration.
A basic distinction which needs to be made in the context of asymmetric
information concerns the stage at which decisions are made, namely ex-ante
or interim.3
Consider ﬁrst the case in which decisions are made at the ex-ante stage,
i.e., before information is revealed to any agent. A well-known price equi-
librium concept for such a model is the notion of an Arrow-Debreu equi-
librium in (complete) markets with contingent commodities. The fact that
in such markets an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium is identical to a Walrasian
equilibrium with an appropriate indexing of commodities by time and state
immediately implies the standard relationship between such allocations and
a corresponding notion of the ex-ante core. (Coalitions in this core notion
use ex-ante utility computations to judge whether or not a feasible alloca-
tion is an objection to a status-quo allocation of contingent commodities).
The standard argument for complete information economies implies not only
1We refer the reader to Anderson (1992) for a survey of results in this area.See also
the section on the Equivalence Principle in Aumann (1987).
2See, for example, Anderson and Zame (1997), Anderson, Trockel and Zhou (1997),
Hart (1974), Hart and Mas-Colell (1996), Manelli (1991).
3The analysis of ex-post notions of the core or Walrasian equilibria is no diﬀerent from
that in the case of complete information.
1that Arrow-Debreu allocations are ex-ante eﬃcient but also that they be-
long to the ex-ante core. Furthermore, the Debreu-Scarf argument can be
applied (with no more than a re-interpretation) to assert that any ex-ante
core allocation which survives replication is an Arrow-Debreu allocation.
While the Arrow-Debreu model involves incomplete information, it is
essentially one of symmetric uncertainty.4 Asymmetry of information can
be incorporated into this ex-ante framework by postulating that consumers
diﬀer in their ex-post information. One such approach is the one introduced
by Radner (1968), which imposes the requirement that an agent’s trades be
measurable with respect to her private information. Equilibrium allocations
so deﬁned (Radner allocations) bear the standard relationship with an ex-
ante core concept which similarly imposes such measurability restrictions (as
in Allen (1991) and Yannelis (1991)); see Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (1998).
Another approach for dealing with ex-post asymmetry of information (based
on mechanism design) is to directly impose incentive compatibility on agents’
trades. A corresponding price equilibrium notion is the one used in Prescott
and Townsend (1984). Here, even in the ex-ante case, matters are no longer
so simple. As Forges, Heifetz and Minelli (1999) show, core equivalence does
not generally hold, although a positive result can be established under certain
conditions.
In light of the above discussion, we shall concentrate on the interim stage,
i.e., the stage when agents have received their private information. In this
context, too, the existing literature (Goenka and Shell (1997), Kobayashi
(1980) and Yannelis (1991)) seems to point to the validity of the conver-
gence principle. However, we will begin by showing that the coarse core
of Wilson (1978) does not converge to any set of price equilibrium alloca-
tions considered in the literature. To prove our main point we construct a
simple example of a replicated sunspot economy with strictly convex and
monotonic preferences.5 Thus, even when uncertainty does not aﬀect the
fundamentals of the economy, core convergence fails. We also show that the
coarse core may not satisfy the equal treatment property (even with strictly
4See Chapter 19 of Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995) for an excellent presentation
of this material.
5The example we construct for this purpose also shows that core equivalence need
not hold in an economy with an atomless measure space of consumers.This refutes the
conjecture on core equivalence in Kobayashi (1980), page 1647.We also refute (in Section
4) the conjecture in Yannelis (1991, Remark 6.5).
2convex, monotonic preferences). Moreover, coarse core allocations satisfying
the equal treatment property may not converge to market allocations. The
underlying reason for our negative results can be traced to an important im-
plication of cooperation in the presence of asymmetric information. Suppose
there are two states of the world, s and t, and two agents: one is informed
and the other is uninformed. A coalitional improvement will typically re-
quire (for the usual reasons related to adverse selection) that the informed
consumer be made better-oﬀ in both states of the world. This translates into
a restriction on allowable coalitions, which, as we shall see, can be enough
for a failure of the standard Debreu-Scarf argument.
Are these negative results driven by the fact that, despite replication,
agents in our model do not become informationally small?6 This is not so, at
least in terms of the notion of informational smallness recently formalized in
McLean and Postlewaite (1999). Whether there is a diﬀerent sense in which
agents in our model are not informationally small is, we believe, an important
question that needs to be examined more carefully in future research.
It is also natural to ask whether convergence may obtain if one considers
other interim core notions. In Section 4 we establish that this is not the case
– our non-convergence result is robust to many reasonable modiﬁcations of
either the (interim) core or the (interim) price equilibrium concept. We
conclude that the convergence/equivalence principle does not hold in the
presence of informational asymmetries (at the interim stage).
2 An Interim Economy with Asymmetric In-
formation
Consider an exchange economy with a ﬁnite set of consumers, N, and a ﬁnite
set of states of the world, Ω. There are a ﬁnite number of commodities, and
the consumption set of each consumer is I R
l
+ in each state. A consumption
plan of consumer i is a function xi :Ω → IR
l
+.L e tXi denote the set of all
consumption plans for consumer i.F o rA ⊆ Ω, Xi(A) denotes the set of all
xi(A) ≡ (xi(ω))ω∈A)w h e r exi(ω) ∈ IR
l
+ for all ω ∈ A. The endowment of i is
denoted ei ∈ Xi.C o n s u m e ri has a Bernoulli utility function ui :I R
l
+ × Ω  →
I R; for a consumption plan xi, ui(xi(ω),ω) denotes the utility of i in state
6They do, of course, become small in the traditional sense of “endowment smallness”.
3ω. We shall assume that for all i ∈ N and all ω ∈ Ω, ui(.,ω) is continuous,
monotonic and concave.
The private information of consumer i is represented by Pi, a partition of
Ω. For a state ω ∈ Ω, let Pi(ω) be the element of Pi which contains ω.T h u s ,
when the state is ω,c o n s u m e ri knows that the true state lies in Pi(ω).7
Each consumer i is assumed to have a probability measure µi on Ω which
represents i’s prior beliefs regarding the states. We assume that for each
A ∈P i, µi(A) > 0. For ω ∈ Ωw ed e n o t eb yµi(ω |P i(ω)), the conditional
probability assigned by consumer i to state ω. For a consumption plan xi






Consumer i prefers consumption plan xi to consumption plan yi at state ω
whenever Ui(xi |P i(ω)) >U i(yi |P i(ω)).
An economy is deﬁned as E =  Ω,N,(Pi,u i,e i,µ i)i∈N .
An allocation for an economy is (xi)i∈N ∈







ei(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω.
Thus an allocation can be viewed as a state-contingent contract which is
feasible in each state. Let AN denote the set of allocations. A coalition S is






ei(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω.
Let AS denote the set of allocations feasible for S.
Coalition formation in our model takes place at the interim stage. More
precisely, if the true state is ω, each consumer observes the event Pi(ω)a n d
at this stage consumers may form coalitions and agree to an allocation which
is feasible for the coalition. We shall assume that when a contract has to
be enforced, the true state is publicly veriﬁable. This obviates the need for
imposing incentive compatibility constraints on allowable allocations. Our
7This formulation is equivalent to one in which the private information of each consumer
is described by the consumer’s type and an information state for the economy refers to
a proﬁle of consumers’ types.In particular, each element of the partition Pi refers to a
particular type of consumer i.
4main results continue to hold even without this simplifying assumption; see
Section 4 below. A notion of the core suitable for the present context is
the coarse core of Wilson (1978) which is based on the idea that a coalition,
in designing a potential objection, can only consider those events which are
commonly known to consumers in the coalition. To describe such events we
need some additional notation. Let (Pi)i∈S be an information structure for S.
The meet of the partitions (Pi)i∈S is the ﬁnest partition of Ω that is coarser
than each Pi, i ∈ S, and it is denoted by PS = ∧i∈SPi.A ne v e n tE is said to
be common knowledge among the members of S at ω if PS(ω) ⊆ E.W ec a n
now say that coalition S has an objection to allocation x if there is another
allocation y ∈A S, and a state ω ∈ Ω at which it is common knowledge
among the members of S that each i ∈ S prefers yi to xi.E q u i v a l e n t l y ,
coalition S is said to have a coarse objection to an allocation x ∈A N if there
exists y ∈A S and an event E ⊆P S such that
Ui(yi | A) >U i(xi | A) for all i ∈ S, for all A ∈P i such that A ⊆ E.
The coarse core is the set of all x ∈A N to which there does not exist a
coarse objection.
An allocation x ∈A N is said to be interim eﬃcient if N does not have a
coarse objection to x. Similarly, x ∈A S is said to be interim eﬃcient for S
if S does not have a coarse objection to x.
Our aim is to study the relationship between the coarse core and a cor-
responding price equilibrium notion as an economy is replicated.
Clearly, any such exercise must involve a price equilibrium concept which
captures decision making at the interim stage.8 Moreover, for the present
exercise it is reasonable to consider a price equilibrium notion such that
the corresponding allocations belong to the coarse core. We now turn to a
deﬁnition of such equilibrium notion.
While Wilson (1978) established the non-emptiness of the coarse core by
constructing a corresponding NTU game and proving it to be balanced, he
also pointed out (footnote 6, Wilson (1978)) that an alternative proof consists
of showing that the coarse core contains a constrained market allocation.
8It is easy to see that the ex-ante core bears no logical relationship to the coarse core
since the latter is based on interim considerations; see Vohra (1999) for examples.There
is, therefore, no hope of establishing a core convergence/equivalence result for the coarse
core and ex-ante equilibrium concepts such as the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium.
5Let p =( p(ω))ω∈Ω denote a vector of state-contingent market prices where
p(ω) ∈ IR
l for ω ∈ Ω. Let   denote the unit simplex in I R
l×|Ω|. For consumer
i and A ∈P i, the budget set of consumer i corresponding to the event A,
given a price vector p ∈ is denoted
γi(p | A)={xi(A) ∈ Xi(A) |

ω∈A




A constrained market equilibrium is deﬁned as (x,p) ∈A N × such that
for every i ∈ N and A ∈P i,
xi(A) ∈ arg max
γi(p|A)
Ui(. | A).9
It is easy to see that constrained market equilibria satisfy several proper-
ties that are analogous to those of Walrasian equilibria. In particular:
(i) An equilibrium allocation belongs to the coarse core.
(ii) A replication10 of an equilibrium allocation is an equilibrium allocation
of the corresponding replicated economy.
(iii) The converse of (ii) also holds if all consumers have strictly concave
Bernoulli utility functions.
This equilibrium notion, therefore, provides a natural benchmark as a price
equilibrium concept to which one might expect coarse core allocations of
replicated economies to converge. In the next section we show through a
simple example of a sunspot economy that the coarse core does not converge
to the set of constrained market allocations.
The critical property of a price equilibrium concept which our negative
result relies upon is the following:
Property P. Suppose (x,p) is an equilibrium and there exists ω ∈ Ω and a
consumer i such that {ω}∈P i.T h e n
xi(ω) ∈ arg max
γi(p|{ω})
ui(.,ω).
9While there is some abuse of notation in the use of Ui(. | A) above, this should not
cause any confusion since Ui(xi | A) actually depends only on xi(A).
10Precise deﬁnitions follow.
6Clearly, Property P is satisﬁed by a constrained market equilibrium. In
restricted market participation economies, which we consider in the next sec-
tion, sunspot equilibria (as deﬁned by conditions (7), (8) and (9) in Cass and
Shell (1983)) are identical to constrained market equilibria, and, therefore,
satisfy Property P. Property P is also satisﬁed, in the economies we con-
sider, by Radner equilibrium (throughout this paper a Radner equilibrium
will refer to an equilibrium in the sense of Radner (1968)) and by rational
expectations equilibrium; see Section 4 for details.
As we shall be dealing with replica economies, we need some additional,
related deﬁnitions. Given an economy E =  N,(Pi,u i,e i,µ i)i∈N ,a n da n
allocation x ∈A N, replicas of E and x are deﬁned as follows. For every
positive integer m,l e tM = {1,2,...,m}. The m-th replica of E is the economy
Em =  N×M,(P(i,j),u (i,j),e (i,j),µ (i,j))(i,j)∈N×M ,w h e r ef o ra l l( i,j) ∈ N×M,
P(i,j) = Pi, u(i,j) = ui, e(i,j) = ei,a n dµ(i,j) = µi.T h e m-th replica of x is
denoted xm where xm
ij = xi for all (i,j) ∈ N × M.11
An allocation x in Em is said to satisfy the equal treatment property if
xij(ω)=xik(ω) for all i ∈ N,a n df o ra l lj,k ∈ M.
The following Lemma, the proof of which is left to the reader, will be
useful in various results to follow.
Lemma 1 Suppose x is an allocation in Em to which coalition S has a coarse
objection. Then
(a) S has a coarse objection y such that y is interim eﬃcient for S.
(b) Suppose all utility functions are concave. Then S has a coarse objection
y with the property that for any i ∈ N:
if ui(xij(ω)) = ui(xik(ω)) for all (i,j),(i,k) ∈ S and all ω ∈ Ω,
then yij(ω)=yik(ω) for all j,k ∈ M and all ω ∈ Ω.
11We shall sometimes ﬁnd it convenient to refer to consumer (i,j) ∈ N ×M as consumer
ij.
73 Failure of Core Convergence: A Sunspot
Economy
Our main results are negative. The fact that we will derive them from exam-
ples of very simple economies makes them all the more compelling. Indeed,
throughout this section, we shall consider economies in which uncertainty is
extrinsic to the fundamentals of the economy. We consider sunspot economies
consisting of two states and two kinds of consumers – those who are fully in-
formed and those who cannot distinguish between either state at the interim
stage. The economy can then be seen as a restricted market participation
economy of Cass and Shell (1983) in which informed consumers can partic-
ipate only in spot markets. For our purposes then, an economy E is said to
be a sunspot economy if Ω = {s,t}, N = N1 ∪ N2, Pi = {Ω} for all i ∈ N1
and Pi =( {s},{t}) for all i ∈ N2 and for all i ∈ N, ui(.,s)=ui(.,t)a n d
ei(s)=ei(t). Note that for coalition S such that S ∩ N1  = ∅,t h eo n l yc o m -
mon knowledge event is {s,t}, whereas for a coalition S such that S∩N1 = ∅,
there are two common knowledge events, {s} and {t}.
As pointed out in the previous section, in a sunspot economy, the deﬁ-
nition of a sunspot equilibrium (see Cass and Shell (1983)) corresponds ex-
actly to the deﬁnition of a constrained market equilibrium. In particular,
informed consumers maximize ex-post utility subject to their ex-post budget
constraint, while uninformed consumers maximize expected utility subject
to a single budget constraint (involving contingent commodities). Clearly, a
sunspot equilibrium satisﬁes property P.
Consider the following example of a two-consumer, restricted market par-
ticipation economy.
Example 1.
• N = {1,2},Ω={s,t}
•P 1 =( {s,t})a n dP2 =( {s},{t})
• ui((a,b),ω)=( ab)1/4 for i =1 ,2a n df o rω = s,t
• e1(s)=e1(t)=( 0 ,24) and e2(s)=e2(t)=( 2 4 ,0)
• µi(s)=µi(t)=1
2,f o ri =1 ,2.
8This simple sunspot economy has a unique sunspot equilibrium, (¯ x, ¯ p), where
¯ x1(s)=¯ x2(s)=¯ x1(t)=¯ x2(t)=( 12 ,12), ¯ p(s)=¯ p(t)=( 1 /4,1/4).
Thus, the unique equilibrium is actually sunspot-free, in the sense that for
each consumer i,¯ xi(s)=¯ xi(t). Clearly, for any integer m,( ¯ xm, ¯ p)i st h e
unique price equilibrium in Em.O f c o u r s e , ¯ x belongs to the coarse core
(Wilson (1978), footnote 6).
One ingredient in the Debreu-Scarf (1963) core convergence argument is
the equal treatment property of core allocations (given strict convexity of
preferences). In the present context, this is the property that if x belongs
to the coarse core of Em,t h e nx satisﬁes the equal treatment property. We
b e g i nb ys h o w i n gt h a t ,i nE x a m p l e1,t h i sp r o p e r t yd o e sn o th o l d . 12
Proposition 1 T h ec o a r s ec o r ei nar e p l i c ao fs i z e2o ft h ee c o n o m yi n
Example 1 contains an allocation which does not satisfy the equal treatment
property.
Proof. Consider a replica of size 2 of the economy described in Example 1
and the following allocation, y:
y11(s)=y12(s)=y11(t)=y12(t)=( 12 ,12).
y21(s)=( 10 ,10),y 22(s)=( 14 ,14),
y21(t)=( 14 ,14),y 22(t)=( 10 ,10).
Of course y does not satisfy equal treatment. We claim that y does belong
to the coarse core of E2.
Clearly y is individually rational therefore one person coalitions cannot
coarsely improve upon y.I ti sa l s oe a s yt os e et h a ty is interim eﬃcient. It
also follows from individual rationality of y that a two-consumer coalition
consisting of both informed players or of both uninformed players does not
have an objection to y. Consider a two-consumer coalition containing one
12As we shall see, the failure of equal treatment in the present context is a result of
interim restrictions on coalition formation, and is therefore quite distinct from the problem
in ex-ante economies.In particular, the failure of equal treatment in Forges, Heifetz and
Minelli (1999) stems from incentive compatibility constraints, and in Koutsougeras and
Yannelis (1993) it is a result of measurability restrictions.
9uninformed and one informed consumer, for example the coalition {11,21}.
By Lemma 1(a) we can concentrate on potential objections which are ex-
post eﬃcient in each state. This implies that in each state consumer i’s
consumption of the two commodities must be the same. From the strict
concavity of consumer 11’s utility function it follows that it is impossible to
provide him ex-ante utility of
√
12 while ensuring that consumer 21 receives
at least a utility of
√
14 in state t and at least
√
10 in state s. Here we see
why the standard proof of the equal treatment property (Debreu and Scarf
(1963)) cannot be applied in the present context. The usual argument would
apply if we could construct a ‘coalition’ consisting of consumer 11, consumer
21 in state s and consumer 22 in state t. Of course, such a ‘coalition’ has
no meaning here. This is the fundamental reason for the failure of the equal
treatment property in the presence of incomplete information. Of course,
for a complete proof of the proposition we also need to verify the following
Claim, whose proof is provided in the Appendix.
Claim 1: No three-player coalition has an objection to y.
The fact that the allocation, y, constructed in the proof of the above
proposition is not sunspot-free is not accidental. Suppose x is a sunspot-
free allocation in the coarse core of Em.F o ri ∈ N2,l e tik∗ be an informed
consumer who receives, according to x, a least preferred commodity bundle
(across all consumers ik, k ∈ M) in state ω, i.e.,
ui(xik∗(ω)) ≤ ui(xik(ω)) for all k ∈ M.
Since x is sunspot-free, this property holds for all ω ∈ Ω. Thus we can
identify, for each i ∈ N2, a particular consumer who (among his types in
the replica) receives, at x, a least preferred commodity bundle. And this
allows us to use the argument of Debreu-Scarf (1963, Theorem 2) to make
the following claim:
Lemma 2 Suppose x is sunspot-free and belongs to the coarse core of Em.I f
ui(.,ω) is strictly concave for all i and ω,t h e nx satisﬁes the equal treatment
property.
Quite independently of the equal treatment property, one may still ask
whether an allocation x in the economy E whose replica xm is in the coarse
10core of Em for every m, can be supported by a price equilibrium. Our next
proposition provides a negative answer. As such it shows that the failure of
core convergence cannot be attributed to the violation of the equal treatment
property illustrated by Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 Let E be the economy deﬁned in Example 1. There exists an
allocation x in E whose replica xm i si nt h ec o a r s ec o r eo fEm for all m,s u c h
that x cannot be supported as an equilibrium satisfying property P.
Proof. Consider the following allocation x:
x1(s)=( 9 ,9),x 1(t)=( 16 ,16)
x2(s)=( 15 ,15),x 2(t)=( 8 ,8).
To prove the proposition, we will show that xm belongs to the coarse core
of Em for all m. Clearly, x cannot be supported by an equilibrium satisfying
Property P, since the equilibrium relative price in each state must be 1, and
the informed consumer in state t is then trading below his budget line.
Suppose there exists m such that xm does not belong to the coarse core
of Em. Suppose coalition S has a coarse objection y to xm.I ti se a s yt os e e
that xm is interim individually rational. This implies that S must contain
both kinds of consumers (uninformed and informed). Let k1 and k2 be the
number of uninformed and informed consumers in S, respectively. By Lemma
1, there is no loss of generality in assuming that y satisﬁes equal treatment
and is interim eﬃcient for coalition S.L e ty1 denote the consumption plan
of each uninformed consumer and y2 the consumption plan of each informed
consumer in coalition S. Coarse blocking implies that:







The aggregate endowment of coalition S in each state is
eS(s)=eS(t)=eS =( 2 4 k2,24k1). (4)
By ex-post eﬃciency of y (for coalition S), it follows that the marginal rate of
substitution of each consumer in state ω = s,t must be the same. Since the
11utility functions are Cobb-Douglas, this implies that there exist constants
α,β ∈ (0,1) such that: (i) in state s, the total amount of each commodity,
allocated to the uninformed consumers is the fraction α of coalition S’s aggre-
gate endowment of that commodity, and the remainder, namely the fraction
(1 − α) is allocated to the informed consumers; and (ii) in state t,t h es a m e
is true with fractions β and (1−β). Thus, the consumption plan of each un-
informed consumer is (α/k1)eS in state s and (β/k1)eS in state t. Similarly,
the consumption plan of each informed consumer is ((1 − α)/k2)eS in state
s and ((1 −β)/k2)eS in state t. This implies that the utilities corresponding
































k1k2 ω = s,t.





zω = s,t. (5)




















Taking square roots on both sides of (6) and (7), and using (1), we have:
gs(z)+gt(z) > 7( 8 )
To complete the proof the reader must show that (8) cannot hold. To
do this, notice that the functions gs(·)a n dgt(·) are both diﬀerentiable and
concave in z.M o r e o v e rgs(1) + gt(1) = 7. It then suﬃces to show that the
derivative of gs(z)+gt(z)i s0a tz = 1, which can be easily done.
This completes the proof that xm belongs to the coarse core of Em for
any m.
Notice that the argument we have used for showing that xm does not be-
long to the coarse core of every replicated economy also applies (with obvious
modiﬁcations) to an economy with an atomless measure space of consumers.
In an economy in which half the consumers have the characteristics of con-
sumer 1and half have the characteristics of consumer 2 in Example 1 , x
belongs to the core where x1 and x2 denote the consumption of all consumers
of each of the two kinds of consumers.
Recall that in any replication of the economy of Example 1there are
several agents who are completely informed. In particular, no single agent
possesses information which is not available elsewhere in the economy. Repli-
cation therefore ensures that information is non-exclusive in the sense of
Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986), and agents in our model are, therefore,
informationally (arbitrarily) small according to the deﬁnition introduced in
McLean and Postlewaite (1999).
The proof of Proposition 2 is instructive in that it shows why the standard
Debreu-Scarf argument does not apply to the coarse core. A coarse objec-
tion for a coalition consisting of informed as well as uninformed consumers
must provide for an improvement in the expected utility of the uninformed,
and in the interim (in the present case, ex-post) utility of both ‘types’13 of
the informed consumers. This requirement is necessary for the potential ob-
jection to be common knowledge among all members of the coalition. As
in Goenka and Shell (1997), one can transform the restricted participation
13Not to be confused with the common usage of ‘types’ in replica economies!
13economy into a quasi-Walrasian economy in which an informed consumer
is transformed into two consumers, one for each state of the world. Thus
an informed consumer of ‘type’ s has endowment only in state s and con-
sumes only in state s. In terms of the quasi-Walrasian economy, the common
knowledge requirement of a coarse objection means that allowable coalitions
are restricted to have the same number of informed consumers of type s
as of type t. It is this restriction which accounts for the non-convergence
phenomenon. Without such a restriction the usual Debreu-Scarf argument,
applied to quasi-Walrasian consumers does yield ‘convergence’. However, the
corresponding notion of the core with quasi-Walrasian consumers does not
have any natural interpretation in terms of a core with asymmetric informa-
tion; see for example the discussion in Vohra (1999).
There is one particular case in which the core of the economy with quasi-
Walrasian consumers coincides with the coarse core, and this provides us with
a positive convergence result, at least for certain core allocations. As the next
proposition shows, in economies such as the one in Example 1, convergence
does indeed hold if one restricts attention to those allocations in the coarse
core which are sunspot-free. (Recall that the core allocation considered in
Proposition 2 is not sunspot-free.)
Proposition 3 Let E be a sunspot economy, and suppose that the core con-
vergence theorem holds at the ex-post stage. If x is sunspot-free and xm
belongs to the coarse core of Em for every m,t h e nx is a sunspot equilibrium
allocation.
Proof. Suppose not, i.e., suppose x is a sunspot-free allocation such that xm
belongs to the coarse core of Em for every m but x is not a sunspot equilibrium
allocation. Since x is sunspot-free, this must mean that in any state ω,t h e
projection of x onto that state, x(ω), is not a Walrasian allocation of the
ex-post economy. Since the core convergence theorem holds at the ex-post
stage, there exists a replica of size m of the ex-post economy in state ω and
a coalition S(ω) of agents improving upon xm(ω). Because the allocation x
is sunspot-free, the same is true in every ω, where the same coalition of ex
post consumers is an improving coalition. Therefore, there exists a coarse
improvement upon xm: letting S(ω)=S1 ∪ S2(ω), the types in the coarsely
improving coalition are S1 ∪

ω∈Ω S2(ω) and the coarse improvement is the
allocation that uses the ex-post objection in each state.
144 Robustness of the Results
4.1 Modiﬁcations of the Coarse Core
In this subsection we shall consider several modiﬁcations of the coarse core,
already suggested in the literature,14 and show that our results in the previous
section are robust to each of these.
A model in which private information is not publicly revealed even af-
ter exchange takes place motivates the introduction of incentive compatibil-
ity constraints. Analogous to the eﬃciency notions incorporating incentive
compatibility, as introduced in Holmstrom and Myerson (1983), one can con-
sider a corresponding notion of the incentive compatible coarse core, as in
Vohra (1999). Recall that in our model replication renders information non-
exclusive in the sense of Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986). It then follows
from Proposition 3.1in Vohra (1 999) that in every replication of the econ-
omy, the allocation, xm, constructed in the proof of Proposition 2 belongs to
the incentive compatible core of Em. Thus, in the economy of Example 1,
the incentive compatible core does not converge to the equilibrium allocation
(which is also incentive compatible).
Reﬁnements of the coarse core, which allow for some pooling of private
information, such as the coarse+ core introduced by Lee and Volij (1997)15
and the core with endogenous communication of Volij (1997) do not help in
terms of convergence either. In fact it can be shown that in the economy E
of Example 1, in every replication, m, the allocation xm (constructed in the
proof of Proposition 2) belongs to these cores in Em.
Going further in the direction of sharing information, one can consider
arbitrary forms of information pooling, corresponding to Wilson’s (1978) ﬁne
core. As Wilson showed, the ﬁne core may be empty. For this reason alone,
the ﬁne core does not converge to a price allocation.
The model in Goenka and Shell (1997) can be viewed as one of asym-
metric information. In their deﬁnition 5.6, the authors consider a variant of
the coarse core where objections are deﬁned without reference to a common
knowledge event.16 For our purposes, it will be enough to concentrate on
14See Forges (1998) for a survey.
15See also Lee (1998).
16Note that for the particular case of sunspot economies, the core (in the pooling case)
used in Ichiishi and Idzik (1996) is the same as the one in deﬁnition 5.6 of Goenka and
15sunspot economies as deﬁned in Section 3. In particular, Ω = {s,t} and the
randomizing device is based on the σ-algebra generated by the ﬁne parti-
tion ({s},{t})). In this setting, the essential diﬀerence17 between their core
notion and the coarse core concerns only the case in which an objecting
coalition, S, contains no uninformed consumers. In such a case, they require
all the (informed) members of the S to be better-oﬀ in both states. In con-
trast, recall that for a coarse objection from S (containing no uninformed
consumers) it suﬃces that there is some state in which all its members are
better-oﬀ. Therefore, their core contains the coarse core, and the conclusions
of Propositions 1and 2 extend to it. In light of these remarks, Lemma 7.1
and Theorem 7.3 in Goenka and Shell (1997) should be seen as applying to
the core of an economy with quasi-Walrasian consumers rather than to a
notion of the core in asymmetric information economies.18
4.2 Other Notions of Price Equilibria
Proposition 2 applies to any price equilibrium notion satisfying Property
P.19 As we have already observed, constrained market equilibria and sunspot
equilibria (in a restricted market participation economy) satisfy this property.
So do Radner equilibria and rational expectations equilibria of an economy
in which trade takes place only in spot markets. It is easy to see that these
equilibrium concepts also yield ¯ x as the unique equilibrium allocation in the
economy described in Example 1.
One may also consider Radner equilibria or rational expectations equi-
libria in an economy in which trade, at the interim stage, is in contingent
commodities. In the economy described in Example 1, this means that four
contingent commodities are traded at the interim stage. Since the informed
consumers trade after receiving their signal, the market prices for these four
commodities, in general, depend on the signal received by the informed. Let
Shell (1997).
17There are two other diﬀerences: (i) they require allocations to be measurable with
respect to the σ-algebra used for deﬁning randomizing devices.However, this measurability
restriction is void if one considers, as we do, the ﬁne σ-algebra.(ii) they deﬁne objections
using weak inequalities (and some strict inequality), but this does not aﬀect our arguments.
18We thank Karl Shell for clarifying this point.
19Also implicit in our argument is the linearity of the price functional.The possibility
of examining this issue in the context of non-linear prices, as in Bisin and Gottardi (1998),
remains open.
16ps =( ps(s),p s(t)) denote the market prices when the signal received by the
informed consumer is s. Similarly, let pt denote the market prices when the
signal received by the informed consumer is t. Since informed consumers are
allowed to trade in contingent commodities, in general, it is possible that
Property P is not satisﬁed in equilibrium. However, it can be shown that in
the economy of Example 1, these equilibria do satisfy property P. It is easy
to see that the equilibrium prices are ps(s)=( 1 /2,1/2), ps(t)=( 0 ,0) and
pt(s)=( 0 ,0), pt(t)=( 1 /2,1/2). A rational expectations equilibrium, there-
fore, results in both consumers consuming (12,12) in each state. (There is no
non-revealing rational expectations equilibrium). Since this allocation is the
same in both states, it is also the unique outcome of a Radner equilibrium.
A skeptical reader may still wonder whether non-convergence can be
shown for a core allocation which is measurable with respect to the private
information of the uninformed consumers. In Example 1, this measurability
restriction is the same as requiring the coarse allocation to be sunspot-free.
And as we have seen in Proposition 3, it was critical for the proof of Propo-
sition 2 that x was not sunspot-free. However, in the next subsection we
will show, by considering an economy which is not a sunspot economy, that
measurability restrictions are not enough to restore core convergence.
4.3 Measurability Considerations
We shall now construct a non-sunspot economy in which there exists an
allocation, x, which is constant across states such that its replication belongs
to the coarse core in the corresponding replicated economy and x is not a
price equilibrium allocation. This allocation also belongs to the core studied
in Yannelis (1991).20
Example 2.
• Ω={s,t}, N = {1,2}
•P 1 =( {s,t})a n dP2 =( {s},{t})
• u1((a,b),s)=a1/4b3/4, u2((a,b),s)=2 a1/4b3/4
20In this core notion, allocations are required to be measurable with respect to each
consumer’s private information and, as in Goenka and Shell (1997) and Ichiishi and Idzik
(1996), informed consumers in an objecting coalition must be made better-oﬀ in each state.
17and ui((a,b),t)=a3/4b1/4 for i =1 ,2
• e1(s)=e1(t)=( 0 ,24) and e2(s)=e2(t)=( 2 4 ,0)
• µi(s)=µi(t)=1
2, i =1 ,2.
Consider the following allocation x:
x1(s)=x2(s)=( 12 ,12)
x1(t)=x2(t)=( 12 ,12).
It is easy to check that in an economy with spot markets there is a
unique, fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium21 with prices p(s)=
(1/4,3/4) and p(t)=( 3 /4,1/4). The corresponding allocation is ˜ x,w h e r e
˜ x1(s)=( 18 ,18), ˜ x2(s)=( 6 ,6),
˜ x1(t)=( 6 ,6), ˜ x2(t)=( 18 ,18).
It can also be shown, as in the previous subsection, that in a market with
contingent commodities, ˜ x is the unique allocation corresponding to a ratio-
nal expectations equilibrium. While ˜ x is not the allocation corresponding
to a Radner equilibrium (with spot markets or with contingent commodity
markets), it can, nevertheless, be shown that in either case the equilibrium
allocation is not x.
We will now show that xm belongs to the coarse core for every replication.
We argue by contradiction. Suppose there is a replica Em such that xm does
not belong to its Coarse Core. Let S be a coalition which improves upon
xm with an allocation y.S i n c e xm is (interim) individually rational and
preferences are convex, S must contain both kinds of consumers (uninformed
and informed). Let k1 and k2 be the number of uninformed and informed
consumers in S, respectively. By Lemma 1, we may assume that y satisﬁes
equal treatment and is interim eﬃcient for S. Following the same steps as in




To complete the proof we must show that this inequality cannot hold.
To do this, notice that the function on the LHS is diﬀerentiable and concave
21This is also the unique constrained market equilibrium
18in z. M o r e o v e rt h eL H S=R H Sw h e nz = 1. In fact, the function on the
LHS reaches a maximum at z = 1, and can, therefore never exceed the RHS.
Therefore, xm belongs to the coarse core of Em for any m.
19Appendix
P r o o fo fC l a i m1 .Consider a possible objection from coalition {11,21,21}.
Suppose this coalition has an objection, z. The aggregate endowment of this
coalition is (24,48). Ex-post eﬃciency in this coalition then requires that for
each consumer, in each state, the consumption of commodity 1be twice as
much as that of commodity 2. Thus z can be written as follows:
z21(s)=( 2 a,a),z 22(s)=( 2 b,b).
Since (2a2)1/4 ≥
√
10a n d( 2 b2)1/4 ≥
√
14, it follows that













By a similar argument, the same is true in state t,





Since z is an objection, consumer 11 must have expected utility higher than √
12. Using the above inequalities, this implies 2(24 − 12
√
2)2 ≥ 144, or
√
2 − 1 ≥ 1/2,
which is clearly false. Thus there exists no objection from a coalition con-
sisting of one uninformed consumer and the two uninformed consumers.
Finally, consider a coalition consisting of both uninformed consumers and
one informed consumer, for example, {11,12,21}. Given Lemma 1(b), it
suﬃces to consider a potential objection in which both uniformed consumers
are treated identically. It is easy to see that in this three-consumer coalition
it is not possible to provide all consumers interim utilities corresponding to
the equal-split allocation ¯ x. However, consumer 21needs to be given at least √
10a n d
√
14 in states s and t respectively. From the strict concavity of the
utility functions it follows that this, too, is impossible if the uninformed are
to be made better-oﬀ. The details are as follows. Suppose there exists an
objection z.T h e nz21(s)=( a,2a)a n dz21(t)=( b,2b) such that 2a2 > 100




2. This means that




































2 − 6 > 12,
which is false.
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